Bilateral agreements aimed at restricting the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have been in place since the early 1970s. For the first time in nearly 50 years that nuclear arms control architecture is now potentially heading towards a crisis.Jump to full report >>
Bilateral talks aimed at restricting the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States began during the late 1960s as concern mounted over the rapid expansion in the number of warheads and delivery systems. Over the decades that followed a series of arms control regimes emerged. Today, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, signed in 1987, and the New START treaty signed in 2010, remain in force:
What next for arms control?
With both State Parties now reaching the agreed treaty ceilings by the February 2018 deadline, attention has subsequently shifted toward the future and whether Presidents Trump and Putin will agree to extend the treaty out to 2026, and/or negotiate a successor to the New START treaty, achieving further reductions in their nuclear arsenals. As of June 2018, the United States had an estimated 3,800 operational nuclear warheads; while Russia had 4,350.
Complicating the issue, however, is the wider political relationship between the US and Russia, which is arguably at its lowest since the end of the Cold War, and the ongoing dispute over alleged Russian non-compliance with the INF treaty which is overshadowing the arms control agenda more broadly.
If the INF treaty collapses and the New START treaty is allowed to lapse in 2021, then there will be no limits on the US and Russia’s strategic nuclear forces for the first time since 1972, prompting fears of a new arms race. It will also leave the US and Russia with fewer tools with which to verify the size and composition of each other’s nuclear arsenals.
The INF Treaty dispute
After several years of suspicion and rumour, it was only in 2014 that the US formally, and publicly, accused Russia of being in violation of the INF treaty, following reported Russian testing of a new ground-launched cruise missile (the Novator 9M729) with a range of between 500km and 5,500km. In 2017 the US suggested that Russia had advanced beyond flight testing and had begun to deploy the missile in question, a move which violated “the spirit and intent” of the INF treaty.
As a consequence, in December 2017 the US announced that it would introduce economic and military measures in order to induce Russia back into compliance, which included sanctions and a review of the research and development options for new US conventional, ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. The US Nuclear Posture Review, published in February 2018, reiterated these measures, while also recommending the reintroduction of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles as an INF-compliant response to Russia’s alleged violation. However, both the NPR and the US State Department indicated that the US could cease its pursuit of either option, if Russia returned to full and verifiable compliance with its INF obligations.
Allegations of non-compliance have been consistently disputed by the Russian government which has stated that the missile in question has a much shorter range than the US has suggested and has criticised the US for not providing evidence to the contrary. In turn, Russia has also accused the US itself of violating the INF Treaty with the fielding of its ballistic missile defence system in Europe, which they have argued is capable of launching intermediate-range Tomahawk cruise missiles. Russia has also suggested that the US’ deployment of unmanned combat aerial vehicles is a breach of the treaty’s provisions.
Given the current political climate the prospects for US-Russian arms control do not appear encouraging.
In its recent Nuclear Posture Review, the US very clearly identified Russia as a strategic competitor and one of the main threats driving the assumptions and conclusions of the review. It also clearly linked progress in future arms control to Russian compliance with existing international agreements, such as the INF treaty.
Russia, in turn, has very firmly expressed the belief that the threat to the existing arms control architecture lies with the United States’ refusal to engage in substantive talks and what Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, recently called the “complete malfunction of the American system”.
Resolving the INF impasse or US withdrawal?
Both sides indicated that they were willing to engage in dialogue on the INF treaty, although nothing substantive has emerged from the few meetings that have taken place. Allegations and counter-allegations of non-compliance have continued to be levelled by both parties, while practical efforts or proposals toward allaying the concerns of either side have been distinctly lacking. This has led to concern among commentators and experts that there is, in fact, little genuine interest, by either side, in resolving the dispute.
Indeed, many within the Russian government have long considered the INF treaty discriminatory, and one which places a greater burden on Russia which, unlike the US, is surrounded by third countries in possession of significant intermediate-range cruise missile capabilities. Several Russian critics have also expressed the belief that the treaty inhibits Russia’s effective use of its nuclear forces in order to offset the deficiencies in its conventional military capabilities, in particular in Europe. As such many observers have considered that, for Russia, the strategic benefits to be gained from non-compliance with the INF treaty may, in fact, be worth it.
In the United States the treaty equally has its critics. The belief that the INF treaty constrains the US’s ability to pushback against Russian aggression and intimidation on the world stage was reflected in Congress’ approval of R&D funding for a new intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile in the Defense Authorization Act 2018. Significantly, President Trump’s new National Security Adviser John Bolton has also been a longstanding critic of the INF treaty, referring to it in 2014 as an “obsolete treaty even before Russian cheated”, and has advocated pulling out of the treaty, regardless of whether Russia is compliant or not, as it would allow the US to explore different combinations of weapon types and basing options across all of the services.
Indeed, the influence of John Bolton is considered, by many commentators, to be the reason behind President Trump’s announcement at a campaign rally on 20 October 2018 that the US will withdraw from the INF treaty. The announcement has been considered a significant setback for international arms control and has been met with concern from allies and arms control experts alike who argue that it could lead to an unconstrained and dangerous nuclear arms competition with Russia.
Although the US has not yet formally initiated withdrawal proceedings, with John Bolton apparently in the driving seat there is little to suggest that Trump’s announcement of a withdrawal from the INF treaty is a threat or a diplomatic bargaining chip.
The collapse of the INF treaty would thus appear highly likely and does not bode well for the future of the New START treaty.
An extension or successor to New START
Early on in his Presidency Donald Trump was dismissive of the New START treaty, reportedly calling it “one-sided” in favour of Russia and failing to respond positively to a suggestion allegedly put forward by President Putin that the deal should be extended.
In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review the US outlined its ongoing commitment to implement New START, although stopped short of committing to an extension of the treaty or negotiating a successor agreement. It also offered no proposals for moving this issue forward, claiming that Russia had “rebuffed” US attempts to start discussion on the next round of negotiated reductions. In May 2018, however, the US Government announced that it would conduct an interagency review which would examine “whether to extend, replace or jettison New START or to pursue a different type of approach such as the 2002 SORT treaty”.
The pursuit of ‘other options’, such as SORT, is thought to be something that John Bolton favours greatly as he was involved in the negotiation of that treaty while at the State Department in 2002. He has also been a frequent and vocal critic of New START, deriding it as “unilateral disarmament” by the United States, as, among other things, it failed to take into consideration Russia’s significant arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
President Putin has repeatedly expressed his desire to keep New START, and at the Helsinki summit in July 2018 reportedly presented the Trump administration with a number of proposals “to work together further to interact on the disarmament agenda, military and technical cooperation”. Included in those were proposals to begin discussions on extending New START, reaffirming commitment to the INF treaty and to resume dialogue on Russian concerns about the US’ missile defence plans.
However, giving testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 25 July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed that no specific agreements had been reached on arms control in Helsinki and that the US administration did not yet have a position on whether to extend New START. The Russian government continues, however, to set out its willingness to engage in discussions.
A potential compromise?
While the current political climate makes negotiation of a successor treaty difficult in the near term, extending the treaty to 2026 is widely acknowledged as a potential ‘win-win’ compromise for both Presidents, both in terms of arms control but in US-Russian relations more broadly.
Both Presidents could, by personal agreement, extend the treaty without the need for ratification by the US Senate or the Russian Duma. By taking this option it would allow the existing limits on warheads and delivery systems and the verification regime to continue for a further five years in the hope that US-Russian relations, at some point, chart a more favourable course thereby allowing negotiations on further nuclear reductions to occur.
Pursuing this option would not require any concessions by the US administration toward Moscow and it could be done independently of the INF issue. Maintaining the status quo could be construed by both sides as a political victory while buying some valuable time.
Whether the US administration’s interagency review will regard the extension of New START as an acceptable compromise remains to be seen, however, particularly given the prominent role of NSA John Bolton. The personality and unpredictability of President Trump may also yet play an important part. If the US withdraws from the INF treaty and both Parties do not agree an extension or negotiate any successor to New START, President Trump will be the first sitting US President since Jimmy Carter not to have engaged in meaningful arms control negotiations or restrictions with Russia, and potentially set the US on a path toward a new Cold War. Whether Trump would want to be the President that takes the US in this direction is an interesting question. His personal admiration for President Putin, and the rapport between the two leaders, may yet present opportunities for progress.
Commons Briefing papers CBP-8421
Authors: Claire Mills; Ben Smith; Noel Dempsey